42125

Автор(ы): 
Алескеров Ф. Т. (ИПУ РАН, Лаборатория 25)
Автор(ов): 

4

Параметры публикации
Тип публикации: 
Статья в журнале/сборнике
Название: 
Manipulability of Majority Relation-Based Collective Decision Rules
ISBN/ISSN: 
978-3-319-59421-7
DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-319-59421-7_8
Наименование источника: 
Czarnowski I., Howlett R., Jain L. (eds) Intelligent Decision Technologies 2017. IDT 2017. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies
Обозначение и номер тома: 
V. 72
Город: 
Берлин
Издательство: 
Springer
Год издания: 
2018
Страницы: 
82-91 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-59421-7_8
Аннотация
In the problem of aggregation of rankings or preferences of several agents, there is a well-known result that reasonable social ranking is not strategy-proof. In other words, there are some situations when at least one agent can submit insincere ranking and change the final result in a way beneficial to him. We call this situation manipulable and using computer modelling we study 10 majority relation-based collective decision rules and compare them by their degree of manipulability, i.e. by the share of the situation in which manipulation is possible. We found that there is no rule that is best for all possible cases but some rules like Fishburn rule, Minimal undominated set and Uncovered set II are among the least manipulable ones.
Библиографическая ссылка: 
Алескеров Ф.Т., Карабекян Д.С., Иванов А.А., Якуба В.И. Manipulability of Majority Relation-Based Collective Decision Rules / Czarnowski I., Howlett R., Jain L. (eds) Intelligent Decision Technologies 2017. IDT 2017. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies. Берлин: Springer, 2018. V. 72. С. 82-91 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-59421-7_8.