74172

Автор(ы): 
Алескеров Ф. Т. (ИПУ РАН, Лаборатория 25)
Автор(ов): 

4

Параметры публикации
Тип публикации: 
Глава в книге
Название: 
On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules
ISBN/ISSN: 
978-3-031-21695-4
DOI: 
10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_7
Наименование источника: 
Advances in Collective Decision Making
Город: 
Cham
Издательство: 
Springer
Год издания: 
2023
Страницы: 
95–111 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_7
Аннотация
We study the degree of individual and coalitional manipulability of q-Paretian social choice rules under Impartial Culture. Manipulability is defined as a situation, when an agent or a coalition, which consists of some agents, misrepresents her/their preferences to obtain a better outcome of the social choice rule. We study a class of q-Paretian social choice rules, which consists of four rules: Strong q-Paretian simple majority rule, Strong q-Paretian plurality rule, Strongest q-Paretian simple majority rule, and Condorcet practical rule. For the cases of 3, 4, and 5 alternatives and for the cases from 3 to 100 agents, we use computer modeling to calculate a number of manipulability indices. We provide the analysis of the results for different cases.
Библиографическая ссылка: 
Алескеров Ф.Т., Иванов А.А., Карабекян Д.С., Якуба В.И. On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules / Advances in Collective Decision Making. Cham: Springer, 2023. С. 95–111 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_7.