# 7558

Автор(ов):

1

Параметры публикации
Тип публикации:
Доклад
Название:
Feasibility Problem for Generalized Median Voter Schemes
Наименование конференции:
Game theory and management
Город:
-
Издательство:
-
Год издания:
2009
Страницы:
130-133
Аннотация
For societies with n agents facing a set A of alternatives, a social choice function determines what alternative to choose for each possible profile of preferences. One of important properties of social choice function is strategy-proofness – when best strategy for each agent is to report its preferences truthfully. But, in general, this property is hard to obtain – due to the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem all social choice functions whose range contains more than two alternatives are either dictatorial or manipulable if all possible preferences over alternatives are admissible for all agents. But, applying some restrictions for the domain of admissible preferences, one can achieve existence of nondictatorial strategy-proof social choice functions. I consider the setting when the set of feasible alternatives is a full dimensional compact set in R^n and agent’s preferences multidimensional single-peaked (each agent has unique most preferred alternative - top) with the added requirement that the unconstrained maximal element of these preferences belongs to A.
Библиографическая ссылка:
Коргин Н.А. Feasibility Problem for Generalized Median Voter Schemes / . -: -, 2009. С. 130-133.